

representation there may often be a collision of desires, often the collision of volition with inconsistent desires. There is therefore a real distinction between desire and volition ; there may be a difference of degree, and there is always a difference in this, that volition goes on to action. But still we are persuaded that it is the same attribute of mind which says of this object, I adopt it, I prefer it, I wish it, I desire it, and which says, on there being no competing object, or no object esteemed equal to it, I determine to secure it.

It is of the utmost moment, even in the study of mind as a branch of science, to distinguish between the emotions and the will. We cannot comprehend man's nature and constitution, without conceiving of him as endowed with more than a mere emotional impressibility or receptive sensibility. True, we admire the loveliness of man's emotional nature more than we admire the loveliest of nature's loveliest regions, (indeed, philosophical analysis informs us, that external beauty is to some extent a mere transference of the inward feeling to the physical world.) The play of feeling has to us an interest than the blowing of the breeze, or the rush of waters; and the moving of man's emotional nature, more than even the deep waving of grain in summer, is indicative to us of riches and fruitfulness. Still, we stand up for the existence of a higher faculty, which, no doubt, proceeds upon emotion, but uses it all the while merely to rise to the exercise of its own independent functions.

But it is in ethical, more than in psychological inquiry, that the essential importance of this distinction becomes apparent. It may be doubted whether a person possessed of mere emotion could, in any circumstances, be regarded as responsible. It is when the element of the will, the optative, the power of choice, comes under the view, that we at once declare man to be a

moral and responsible agent.

This may be the proper place for pointing out what we conceive to be the CONDITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY.

The fact that man's MIND is SELF-ACTING, and, in particular,

that the WILL is SELF-ACTING—has its power or law in itself—

is one of the conditions of responsibility. The other two conditions of responsibility seem to be CONSCIENCE and INTELLIGENCE.

There must be conscience to distinguish between right and